Abstract We report experimental findings about subjects' behavior in dynamic decision problems involving multistage lotteries with different timings of resolution of uncertainty. Our withinsubject design allows us to study violations of the Independence axiom and of the dynamic axioms: Dynamic Consistency, Consequentialism and Reduction of Compound Lotteries. More precisely we investigate the extensions in a dynamic framework of the pattern of choices observed in the Common Ratio Effect (CRE). We study the effects of changes in probability and outcomes over CRE-like violations of each dynamic axiom as well as the eventual association between the independence axiom and each dynamic axiom. We find that, although probability and outcomes do not have an impact on general violation levels of the dynamic axioms, each of these parameter dimensions play an important role when it comes to CRE-like violations of the axioms: the probability level for Reduction of Compound Lottery and Dynamic Consistency and the outcomes levels for Consequentialism. Moreover, we find that an important proportion of our subjects verify the Independence axiom but violate some dynamic axioms in a systematic manner. This accounts for the fact that dynamic axioms are not only extensions of the Independence axiom to a dynamic framework but also capture preferences that are independent of those observed with single stage lotteries.
of decision under risk (non-EU models) which account for these effects and thus have stronger 7 descriptive power in a static set up. 
11
Dynamically there are several ways of composing two lotteries. One can consider the compound possible to observe simultaneous violations of the dynamic axioms in a way that do not necessarily 24 imply violations of the independence axiom.
25
In this paper, we build on the work of Cubitt et al. (1998) Compound Lotteries (RCL) using a between-subject design. We propose an experimental de-28 sign that allows two main innovations ; first we test each dynamic axiom at an individual level
29
(within-subject design), second we perform these within-subject tests for different values of the 30 parameters. We can therefore determine which dynamic principle is more prone to be violated 31 and the direction of violation depending on the outcome and the ratio levels. We can also account outcomes. These results are confirmed when subjects who violate more than one dynamic axioms 48 are excluded from our sample. This category of subjects is of particular interest and is composed 49 in a grand majority of individuals who satisfy IND but violate two dynamic axioms in an opposite 50 direction. Interestingly, more than 75% of them exhibits CRE violations of lations of RCL. This systematic pattern of violations constitutes an empirical contradiction to the 52 implicit normative hypothesis (Karni & Schmeidler 1991 , Volij 1994 ) that violations of dynamic 53 axioms are necessarily connected to violations of independence. Finally, we find that CON is the
54
-If RCL and DC hold then CON ⇔ IND. (Volij 1994) -If DC and CON hold then RCL ⇔ IND. (Volij 1994 ) 4 The first experimental investigation of the decomposition of the independence axiom in a dynamic set up is due to Kahneman & Tversky (1979) . Indeed, the isolation effect comes from the decomposition of IND between CON and DC+RCL. 5 In this study the authors refer to separability and timing independence for what we call consequentialism and dynamic consistency. This term was first introduced in the formal Decision Theory literature by Hammond (1988 Hammond ( , 1989 85 and refers to the idea that acts are only valued by their consequences 7 . Formulated in terms of 86 decision trees, consequentialism "would be false if missed opportunities, regrets, sunk costs, etc.
87
affected behaviour and yet were excluded from the domain of consequences". In this paper, we 88 define consequentialism as shown in figure 2. This is a special case of Hammond's (1988) notion 8 .
89
In fact, it corresponds to the separability condition in Machina (1989) , Cubitt et al. (1998) and 90 McClennen (1990) and to forgone event independence in Wakker (1999 have occurred but are revealed not to. Machina (1989) and McClennen (1990) slightly higher than the one (r = 0.25) used by Cubitt et al. (1998) . For r H , we choose a value 129 slightly higher than the one (r = 0.6) used by Starmer & Sugden (1989) and for which they 130 observe more RCRE than CRE 12 .
131
-We fixed two levels for the sure outcome x 2 = 15e and 1979) found an increase in violations of the independence axiom, specifically CRE rejection,
133
for smaller ratios and higher outcomes. Therefore, we decided to control for the effects of the 134 ratio and outcomes levels over the rate of acceptance/rejection of dynamic axioms.
135
-For each of these two levels of x 2 , we fixed two levels of maximal gain x 1 . For x 2 = 15e, we 136 choose x 1 = 20e and x 1 = 24e and for x 2 = 60e, we choose x 1 = 80e and x 1 = 95e. We 137 introduce this additional dimension in order to control for the heterogeneity of risk attitudes 138 in our sample and to gain in statistical discriminative power.
139
With q = 0.8 for all the questions, this makes 8 questions per type of problem except for S 1 where 140 there is no r. To sum up, the experiment 13 was divided as follows:
141
(i) 4 scaled up problem (S 1 ) questions involving a choice between a sure amount of money (x 2 ; 1)
142
and a lottery (x 1 , 0; q)
143
(ii) 8+2 scaled down problem (S 4 ) questions involving a choice between 2 lotteries : ((x 2 , 0; r),
144
and lottery (x 1 , 0; rq)). We added two questions to test for first-order stochastic dominance by
145
proposing a choice between lottery (x, 0; q) and lottery (x * , 0; q) with x * > x.
146
(iii) 8 two-stage problem (S 3 ) questions involving a choice between a simple lottery (x 2 , x 3 ; r), and 147 the two-stage lottery ((x 1 , 0; q), 0; r).
148
9 Laboratoire d'Economie Expérimentale de Montpellier (France) 10 We ran 6 sessions of 19 participants each. 11 For every problem type, participants were given instructions and a short questionnaire to check their understanding of the task. 12 With the aim to study exclusively CRE violations of IND and of the dynamic axioms, it would have been more adequate to use ratio values between 0.1 and 0.5. This is exactly what is done in Nebout & Willinger (2012) . However, in this study we are interested in both CRE and RCRE violations, so it is useful to have a ratio value over one half.
13 Screenshots of each problem type are available in the appendix B.
(iv) 8 Prior lottery problem (S 2 ) questions where, first, participants had to activate manually a prior lottery. Then further instructions were displayed: depending on the outcome of the prior 150 lottery, either (with probability 1 − r) they get nothing and they was no choice to be made 151 or (with probability r) they were told to choose between a sure amount (x 2 ; 1) and a lottery 152 (x 1 , 0; q). From an experimental point of view, an important aspect of this task is that 1 − r is 153 the probability that the subject fails to reach the second stage and therefore the proportion 154 of missing data for this question. The use of monetary incentives is the topic of an active debate among behavioral economists.
167
Depending on the type of experiment, the chosen incentive scheme might have a significant im-168 pact on the results (Camerer & Hogarth 1999 , Read 2005 , Bardsley et al. 2010 
173
We identified four possible incentive schedules: "play one pay one", "play all pay all", random incentive system (RIS) and hypothetical payment. There is no doubt that the "play one pay 175 one" solution is more appropriate for an experimental protocol investigating dynamic preferences 176 (Bardsley et al. 2010, p280) . This requires forming several groups of subjects, each of them facing 177 one problem for real and in isolation. This solution, chosen by Cubitt et al. (1998) 15 "Since the random lottery incentive system is widely used in experimental economics this points to a further motivation for testing dynamic choice principles. In any random lottery design, the subject makes precommitments to actions to be taken conditional on a chance event. Timing independence implies that these precommitments are in line with the actions which would be taken after the realisation of nature's move. Separability implies that the latter actions are identical to those which would have been taken at the relevant decision problems been faced in isolation and for real. Thus, timing independence (DC) and separability (CON) are jointly sufficient for the validity of the random lottery incentive system."
further assumption that the subjects have no special reason to disguise their true preferences".
212
Thus, we payed subject a flat fee of 15e and compensated for travel costs with 5e or 10e depend-
213
ing on the journey required. Nevertheless, there are potential problems raised by this scheme. A 214 first drawback is that it could bias participants' attitude towards risk in reducing their level of risk 215 aversion (Beattie & Loomes 1997 , Holt & Laury 2002 ). This effect is not critical in our protocol 216 since the detection of violations of dynamic axioms is independent of the subjects' risk attitude.
217
A second objection could be that the effect of the resolution of uncertainty in the prior lottery and DC. In fact, this "prediction failure" phenomenon might induce the subjects to give more 222 thought to their answers rather than to give an answer whilst in the grip of their emotions or as 223 a reaction to a "gut feeling". Consequently, we expect our subjects to satisfy DC and CON more 224 frequently than they would do with real incentives. In addition, it is likely that "prediction fail-225 ure" will also occur with RIS because each question has a low probability of being selected which 226 could dilute the emotions due to the resolution of uncertainty in a particular prior lottery problem.
228
In conclusion, given that there is probably no perfect incentive scheme that goes with our within-229 subject protocol, we opted for the one that, in our opinion, minimizes the impact of all possible 230 detrimental effects. 
Statistical methodology of analysis

232
We present the method of aggregation of our data along two parameter dimensions which aims 233 to improve the clarity and the statistical power of our study. First, we merge the samples for x 1 for the same x 2 in order to control for different levels of risk aversion in our sample. In fact,
254
we observe more choice of the riskiest option, U , for the high levels of x 1 (24e and 95e) than for 255 the small levels (20e and 80e). There is only one exception for S 1 where U is more frequently 256 observed for 20e than for 24e. There are no significant differences between the results of our experiment and the ones of Cubitt et al.
258
(1998) 16 . The parameter profile (r = 0.3, x 1 = 24e, x 2 = 15e, x 3 = 0) is comparable with the 259 one used by Cubitt et al. (1998) 
35 43
24 10
33 15
57 14
17 23
38 25
43 65
57 25 Table 4 : Aggregated frequencies.
Result 2 The frequencies of rejection of CON , DCand RCL axioms:
302
(i) are not significantly different from each other whatever level is considered.
303
(ii) are not affected neither by the ratio nor by the outcomes levels.
304
17 This case where the risky option is chosen in the scale up problem and the safe option in the scale down problem. that has been accounted for theoretically by Blavatskyy (2010) ,
In x 1 = 24
7 28
9 28 sification results between EU and Non-EU subjects (Bruhin et al. 2010) . The most observed type
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to explore this dimension of our data and to run this fruitful analysis.
in our sample is the one we are interested in, i.e. subjects who are not verifying the independence 438 axiom and that consequently do not verify one and only one dynamic axiom. These subjects fit 439 in the framework of the theorems of Karni & Schmeidler (1991) and Volij (1994 observe that between 25% and 30% of our subjects are of this 2-switches type. This is a significant 447 proportion of our sample. Therefore it is important to determine if these two switches are random 448 which would suggest that this type should be threaten as noise like the 3-switches type or if these 449 two switches are more systematic which would suggest that this type is behaviorally grounded.
450
Next section investigates this question. 
2-switches subjects
452
In this section, we isolated the 2-switches subjects for each parameter set. The 6 possible profiles 453 are presented in table 9. CRE violations correspond to profiles 3 and 4 for CON, profiles 2 and 5
454
for DC and profiles 1 and 6 for RCL. In table 15, we present the descriptive statistics of these 6 455 profiles for each parameter set. 
35.14 34.68 34.78
10.81 2.42 4.35 Table 9 : Profiles of 2-switches subjects
Result 7 For the 2-switches types, CRE violations of CON and RCRE violations of RCL represent 457 more than 75% of the subsample.
458
We observe that for all our parameter sets, the profiles 3 and 5 represent more than 50% of 459 the 2-switches types. These two profiles correspond to RCRE behavior in RCL (i.e. U 3 /D 4 ). In 460 particular, profile 5 correspond to CRE behavior in DC. Table 15 in appendix A shows that the 461 profiles distribution within 2-switches subjects is not random as profiles 3, 4 and 5 contains more 462 than 75% of the effectives for each parameter set.
463
In addition, an interesting feature of these within subject analysis is that it sheds light on one
464
of the between subject results of Cubitt et al. (1998 whereas it is not possible with a between-subject protocol.
474
This section supports the idea that preferences towards dynamic prospects are not only a subset 
479
However, we cannot exclude the possibility of these 2-switches type subjects just be due to tremble 480 or noise. Therefore it is necessary to check that the results we presented in section 4.2 are robust 481 to their exclusion of our analysis. 
Robustness
483
In this section, we exclude the 2 and 3-switches types from our analysis and present in it is the contrary for high ratio, thus the ratio has a significant impact on the rejection criterion
497
(χ 2 (1) = 17.159 p-value<0.001). There is no outcomes effect (χ 2 (1) = 2.070 p-value=0.150).
498
-Result 5 holds : For RCL, CRE is observed more frequently than RCRE for small ratio whereas 499 it is the contrary for high ratio, thus the ratio has a significant impact on the rejection criterion 
Associations
502
Result 9 Whatever level is considered (global, aggregated over ratios and aggregated over outcomes) In the case of what these authors call dynamic inconsistency which a more general definition than ours and could also be due to Non-Consequentialism using our terminologies.
In conclusion, this experimental study is compatible with the revealed preference paradigm be-
573
cause each decision problem consists of a single binary choice between well-defined prospects.
574
However the set of prospects over which these dynamic preferences are defined is more compli-575 cated than the set of single stage lotteries used in the standard models of decision under risk.
576
This set contains lotteries that could have multiple stages and different timing of resolution of 577 uncertainty. The experimental results presented deepen our understanding of the independence 578 axiom and of the probability mixture operation in a dynamic framework. Our findings may be rel-579 evant to the study of sequential decision making (i.e. where more than one decision are involved). 
